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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

Petitioner,

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ,
UTAH and
POWER LIGHT COMPANY,
oration,

Case No.
10302

is an appeal from a ruling made against ~
er by the Industrial Commission of the State of
GALEN ROSS
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Petition.er
D IRVINE and
B. PORTER
North Temple
City, Utah
, - s for Respondents
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

Prtitioner,
vs.

nm

r~DlTSTRIAL

tlF F'l\.\ ll and

C01fl\fISSION

Case No.
10302

ll'AH POWER LIGHT COMPANY,
I i'OJ']lOJ'a ti on'

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Thi,., i::-; an appeal from a ruling made against the
Ptitiorwr Ji~~ thP Tn<lm;trial CormniRRion of thf' State of
1

I !:1h.

Thi:-; i::-; a JWtition for reviPw of a ruling of thf' fo.
·i11'trial C'onnnisRion.
N'l'A'l'l~MENT OF KIND OF CASE

1111

Appt•llant was injur<>d whilP working for Appellee.
ln~trial ( \J111111isRion denied workman compenRation

2
RELIEF SOUOHrr'
Rc>versal of Industrial Commission's rulino-ti·

The petitioner was injured in an accident which 01 .
curred while he was working for the respondPnt The
petitioner applied for a hearing before the indusiri:il
commission, and filed a claim for cornpemmtion on F1°h 111
ary 18, 19G-L The commission submitted the casr to 1
panel of medieal experts who ruled in favor of th1· ii:
jured, but the commission ruled that the claim was to L:
denied because it had not been filf~d within three »ear,
from the date of the injury or the last payment of li1·11efits.
On September 11, 196-1-, petitioner made a motion l'cr
a rehearing. His motion ·was supported by an affida1it
of Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook which stated that Dr. Holbrook
received the last payment for the medical examinati 11 n
of the petitioner from the respondent on September i:i,
1961. Three ypars had not transpired from the date m
the payment and the filing of the claim with the tomrni.··
sion. The commission granted a rehearing Septemlirr ~:,
1964, but it denied the claim on the ground that the lact
payment of compensation was made on the date of tlie
examination by the doctor rather than on the date nf ik
payment to the doctor.

3
llw r1'hearing vrns held November 9, 1964. The de.·-t"n ,ras rend<~red on December 9, 1964, and the peti\iuner received notice of the decision on December 11,
ilJIJl J:-'etitioner applied to this court for a writ of certi:iri on January 11, 1965.

ARGUMENT

p

I
I

POINT I.

!

i

THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF CERTIORI WAS
FILED WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 35-183, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (195'3),

Section 35-1-83 reads:
"Within thirty days after not-ice that the application for rehearing is denied ... any party
... affected thereby may apply to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiori. . . . "

It is petitioner's contention that application for the
1,

1
1

'1

j
I

e

it was made within thirty days from the date that no-

11
'·

was received of the denial by the commission of
rlaimants' application for a rehearing.

I

1

i
•

Af:eries of decisions prior to 1933 held that the applii:iiion for a writ of certiori must be made within thirty
·in).' from the date of the denial of the rehearing, regardof the fact that no notice is given to the applicant.

1

4
See, e.g., Heledakis v. Inditstrial Commission of L'!uli.
66 Utah 608, 245 P. 334 (1936). And this was held to Ji,.
the case where the stenographer of the commission gan·
misinformation as to whether or not a decision had bePn
rendered by the commission. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industriol
Commission of Utah, 73 Utah 199 273 P. 306 (1928).
In response to these decisions, and to avoid possihle
injustices resulting from such an interpretation of tlw
provisions, the Code Commissioners responsible for tlw
1933 revision of the laws of Utah inserted the wonl
''after notice" into the section of the Code comparable Ju
what is now Section 35-1-83. Utah Rev. Stat., 1933, -±~-l
77.
In the instant case, the denial of the application for
rehearing was made December 9, 1964. Notice of the de
nial was received by the attorney for the claimant on
on December 11, 1964. The petition for the writ of certiori was filed .January 11, 1965.
It is conceded that if notice is not required there

was not a timely application for the writ. But to RO hold

would be to disregard the plain meaning of the statuli'. ,
The only reasonable interpretation of Section 35-1-83 is
that the thirty day period begins to run from the dale
of notice of the denial of the rehearing by the comrnisSlOn.

5

notice is a prerequisite to the running of the
•inrty day period, and since notice was received by the
attorney for p0titioner on December 11, 1964, the thirty
iln) wriod expired on January 10, 1965. However, Janu1
ar)' 10th was a Sunday and is not to be included in computing the prriod. Rather the next day, January 11, the
dat0 tlJP petitioner filed for a writ of certiori, is to be
1 . 111 1~iden~d tlw last day of the thirty day period. U.R.C.P.
i\nle () (a). Since there was a timely petition for a writ
111' C'ertiorari to reviPvV tlw order of the commission deny;n~ tl1r ('!aim of 1wtitioner, the writ should be granted.
,''1ill('('

POINT II.
THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION WAS FILED WITH

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN THE THREE
YEAR PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 35-1-99, UTAH

r,ooE ANNOTATED.

A claim "·ill he barred under the ·workmen's Com!11'nrntion Act unless it is filed with the industrial comJqj,,ion within the prescribed period. Section 35-1-99,
i tali Cod(·

Annotated, provides that:

"If no claim is filed with the industrial commif'f'ion within three years from the date of the
ac<'i(lent, or thf: date of the last payment of comprnsat io 11, the right to compensation shall be
\\holly barred."

6
It is to be noted that the three VPar
period ,' 1•1·111)('"lil·
•
to run from the date of the last paynwnt of cornpc·nsat~in
if such a payment has been made. Petitioner allerre~
tl 13 t
b
there was a payment of compensation; that the paymenl
consisted of the check sent by the respondent to thP
doctor who examined the petitioner; and that thr pr.ti
tioner filed a claim with the commission within tlmi·
years from the date of the payment made by resp 0 ncb:t.
c

The furnishing of medical attention by the emplo)'Pr
is a payment of compensation. See e.g. Richard;;ou r. X11
tional Ref. Co., 136 Kan. 724 ------, 18 P.2d 131 (190~!:
Oklahoma Fi1rniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 16± Okla.~]?,,
23 P.2d 381 (1933). Similarly, where an employee lia>
procured medical attention and he has been reimbnrn·d
by the employer, the reimbursement has been held to
constitute a payment of compensation. Colonial In~.
Co. v. IndHstrial Acddent Commission, 60 Cal. Aw 90.
140 P.2d 442 (194:1).
The commission did not seem to dispute the fart
that the furnishing of medical attention is a payment iii
compensation. Rather, the commission concernt>d ibi,J1
with whether the examination or thP payment to the <lo('
tor by the respondent constituted the payment of c01111wn·
sation.
\Vhere the medical examination has been £urnislwil
• · fem alow
at the insistence of the employer, the exannna 1

7
bePll 11el<l to be a payment of compensation and the
:tatute of limitations will begin to run from that date.

fw:-:

But the procurement of services by the employee does
1111 1 amount to payment of compensation and the time
11 Lriod \rill not be extended. See Solorio v. Wilson Co.,
iiil Kmi. 518, 1G9 P.2d 822 ( 1946).
l

Petitioner lwlieves, however, that when there is a
,uh:-:eq1wnt paynwnt by the employer, after the employee
lia' ohtai11<·<1 an examination on his own, there has been
a J1armP1Jt of compensation within the meaning of the
\ .'tatn(t'. e.f. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com\ ;,1i1"io11, supra, where the subsequent payment was in the
I
i i1Jrlll of reimhursement to the employee.

I

I

The commissioners reasoned that a holding that the
pa)lllellt hy tlw respondent to the doctor, (rather than the

··Hrnination by the doctor), constituted a payment of
111p1·nsation, would subject the employer to a claim that
I
1rna!J JJPVe r be closed, for the petitioner could keep the
\ ,:aim open inddinitely by merely submitting to an ex-

I
I

1 11
•

\ amination.

I

l

I
i

iI

"If the law is construed to mean actual payof a medical examination fee, no claim would
rnr hi> closed because the claimant could keep
the elaim opPn indefinitPly by submitting to an
PXarnination by any doctor at any time, without
the knowledge of the employer." See Appendix.
ll1l'1lt

(Ord<·r of the Commission)

8
Of course, the mere fact that a claim may t•xist for ari
E'xtended period is not sufficient l'Pason in itself for
denying the claim of the injured. ~ee Utah Apex Mlnin g
Co. v. Inditstrial Commission, 209 P.2d 571 (19-±9). Brn
conceding that a timely prosecution of elairns is desirable
I
the reasoning of the commission is faulty. In fact, to ho!J
as the commission did would allow a claimant to perpetually keep his claim open. If the examination ibelr
was payment, as the commission held, then indeed on1·
could keep his claim open by a unilateral submission h1
an examination. If the commission was desirous of pr~
venting an undue extension of the time within 1rhic:1
rlaims may be filed, it should have held that the pay111cnt
of the dortor's fee was the payment of comprnsation.
Finally, the commission argues that the vayment ol
medical benefits is not always an admission of liability.
The petitioner readily concedes this point. Certainly aftf'r
a voluntary payment of medical expenses hy the t·111
ployer, he should be able to urge the defense that the e11 1
ployee did not meet with an accident or that there 1rns nn
casual connection between the injury and the disabilit.1·
cf. Harding v. In. Com. of Utah, 83 Utah 37G, 28P.~cl1S~
(1934). But here we are not dealing with a case whell
the payment of medical expenses is said to he an adrni 1sion of liability precluding the employer from assertin~
a defense. -we are concerned mPrely with whether the
payment \\-as a ''payment of. compensat·10n " within tlie

01
meaning- of Rertion ~fi-1-9 so as to extencl t11e statuh'

9

Jii:iil:itJOllS. The payment is not urged as an admission
r lial1ilit.\ by tlw employer. In those cases where the
1
fnrniKl1ing of" medical attention was said to be a payment
1,.11inp1·nsntion tolling the statute of limitations, the pay11w11t \1-;1s wade lwfore there was any administrative or
;itdicial d('t1·nuination of liability...Whether or not the
11 a>nH•nt \ms an admission of liability was not important
.1Ju·n tlw eonrt was called upon only to decide whether
r!wn· had IH•en an extension of the time period. E.g.
/\1/cll!lll c. Wilson & Co., 138 Kan. 97, 23 P.2d 488 (1933).
,

1

This l'OUrt has consistently held that vVorkmen's
11111111tll~ation Ads should he construed liberally in
favor of cowrage of tlw employee. Askrrn v. Industrial
C11111111s:;ioJ1, 15 Ftah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964). And
11[1,·n· the court is dealing with a valid claim, as in this
1

lmt tlw statute of limitations is asserted as a bar
t11 the daim, then~ is even more reason for construing
tlie ~tatute lilwrally and effectuating coverage of the emplu1.H·.

1 ·~"··

CONCLrSION
TbP pay11wnt of medical expenses constitutes a paywithin the meaning of Section 351-~~. TliP aat<' of respondent's payment to the doctor was
:,,~ ila\1• of the hst payment of compensation. Therefore,
ii: tli1w~ Y<'ar statute of limitations contained within Sec1111 J,j .. J !:!9 did not bar pditimwr from asserting his
i;n111.

"iPnt of 1:0111 wnsation

10
Respectively submitted,

GALEN ROSS
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Petitioner
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APPENDIX "D"

nn;

INDTTSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Claim No. G21 G

1;JY\ II . .JONES
Applim11t,
v:-:.
i"J'.\H !'0\VFJR LIGHT COMPANY,

Drfendant.
TlH' above Pntitlt>d cause came on regularly for hear:tt i-\::ilt Lake City, 1T tah, June 1, 1964, at 10 :00 o'clock
.Ul.. h<'fon th<' Industrial Commission of Utah, puri
.-1wnt to Order and Notice of the Commission. Applicant
I
ii •a.' pr1·sP11t and rt>presented by Galen Ross, attorney;
1Hrndant \rn:-: n presPnted by Robert R. Porter, attorney.
::~·

1

I

1

I
On f<\,hnrnr~' 10, 19G4 applicant filed a claim for an
\ '!!jur:,· all('g<'d to have been incurred on August 29, 1958.
1
'11

"t·ptvmht>r ~i, 1~Hi-!, the Commission issued an Order
I i ·111·ing the clai111 bPcause the claim filed February 10,
\ , ,q 1ra:-; not fil•·<l within three y<•ars from the date of the
j

1

1

1 1n1nr» u1 tlw last payment of benefits. A Motion for
.h":tl'lng \\'a;-; filed hy applicant on September 14, 1964,
1

1

]

:

, '.~/, uu 11 i1l11rit attached, si[Jned by Dr. Boyd G. Hol;
olle.r;in11 that Dr. Holbrook received the last pay.1 fur 11 111erlical e.rnmination on September 22, 19fA
1111
\
''
llu· rll'il'11r/111d.

!

I
II

'>· 1·,·id1·nr<

otlwr than the affidavit was presented.
ipnlab·d that the only issue was an interf!f l71e sfot11/e of limitations, Section 35-1-99,
1

)Jarti<·~~ ,..;I

111111111

12
·which reads as follows: "* * * If nu claim for con. .
· Commission
·
·
· f ·z d · 7 7 I d
t wn
is
. i e wit 1 t ie n ustrinl
withint/Jen.ia.
tlr .
years from t~ie da.te ~f the accident or the last payn;e; 1
of compensation, the n~ht to compensation shall he ,1Jioln
ha rre<l."
·
'
1

If we assume that the examination vy the doctor co 11 .
stitute.s payment of compensation to the claimant \lw
three y0ar statute expired on R0ptPmher 10, 1963, an;l tlH·
appliration was not filP<l until SeptPrnher 10, 19(i-J..
If the law is construed to mean actual payment nl'
a medical Pxamination f PP, no claim would ever he elosPrl
because the claimant eould keep tlw claim open inrMin.
itely 1Jy submitting to an exam1:nation by any doctor at
any time, without th0 knowledgP of the employer. In faet.
the Utah RuprPnw Court held that payment of medieal
hE'nefits is not ahMys an admission of liability. (Section
:);)-1-10) No compPnsation other than the Holhrooknwtli.
ral hill was paid at any timP and that hill was paid almoit
a. yPar aftPr the mP<lical Pxarnination.

We find that the claim of applicant is barrE'd by the
threP yPar statutP of limitations.
IT 18 THEREFOR ORDERED that the rlairn nf
applicant is <leniPi<l.
(SEAT,)
Passed bv the Industrial Comrnisl'ion of 1Ttah, Salt
Lake City, Ft~h, DPremher 9, 19G4.
ATTEST: Gloria B. Hanni, Commission Secretary.
::\fotion N 0 ............ ----·---·-·-·RPsolution No. ______ ..
( s) vViesley, Chairman
( s) I Dissent

CFG, ComrnisRion0r

( s) N f>lson, Commission

